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INTRODUCTION
Approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1995,
extended-release oxycodone (OxyContin®) became a blockbuster drug for its
manufacturer Purdue Pharma. Fifteen years later, the company secured
approval of an abuse-resistant formulation of this product (OxyContin OP®).
From the perspective of legitimate users of this opioid analgesic, OxyContin
OP offers absolutely no advantages over the classic recipe; from a public
health perspective, however, the new formulation appears to reduce serious
risks to illegitimate users. In 2013, just as its contested patents on OxyContin
expired, Purdue managed to persuade the FDA to withdraw its license for the
original formulation, which prevented the introduction of generic copies of
the older version that otherwise would have undercut sales of OxyContin OP.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers routinely introduce new and improved
versions of successful drugs as their patents on older products wind down and
generic rivals prepare to enter the market, which antitrust scholars have
denominated as “product hopping.” Part I elaborates on this phenomenon.
The recent experience with the reformulation of OxyContin, as detailed in
Part II, represents an extreme variant of such arguably anticompetitive
behavior. By virtue of the FDA’s withdrawal of the license for OxyContin,
patients who derive no benefit from the abuse-resistant features will not enjoy
the option of using cheaper generic versions of the older product, instead
having to pay a premium for the new formulation over the next decade or so.
The agency’s decision may well make sense in this context, but, to the extent
that it signals a more general willingness to act favorably upon withdrawal
requests by license holders whenever they introduce modified versions of
their products, the FDA may have given brand-name drug manufacturers a
powerful new mechanism for further delaying generic entry.
I.

A PRIMER ON PRODUCT HOPPING IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY

“Product hopping” refers to line extensions and affiliated strategies used
by brand-name drug manufacturers to retain market share once generic
competition becomes a threat.1 This practice poses antitrust concerns insofar

1. See Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The
Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1016–17, 1020–21 (2010); Stacey L.
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 709–17
(2009); Jessie Cheng, Note, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1472, 1487–89 (2008); M. Sean Royall et al., Antitrust Scrutiny
of Pharmaceutical “Product Hopping,” ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 71; see also Alan Devlin &
Michael Jacobs, Anticompetitive Innovation and the Quality of Invention, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1, 47 (2012) (“[P]roduct hopping is today one of the most controversial practices at the intersection
of antitrust and intellectual property . . . .”); Alan Devlin, Exclusionary Strategies in the Hatch-
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as it effectively allows companies to extend their monopolies even after their
original patents have expired.2 Drug product hopping can happen in several
ways. For instance, manufacturers may introduce—and seek additional patent
protections for—sustained release formulations that require less frequent
dosing or a slightly modified form of the active ingredient with purportedly
greater safety or effectiveness.3 So-called “patent stacking” or “evergreening”
happens with some frequency in the pharmaceutical industry,4 though courts
often invalidate these efforts to extend intellectual property protections.5
Waxman Context, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 631, 658 (crediting Herbert Hovenkamp with coining the
term); Julie Appleby, New Scrutiny of Drugmakers, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2015, at A14.
2. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 715–17; Steve D. Shadowen et al., Anticompetitive
Product Changes in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 44–58, 80–81 (2009); Seth
Silber & Kara Kuritz, Product Switching in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Ripe for Antitrust
Scrutiny?, 7 J. GENERIC MEDS. 119, 124–29 (2010); see also Carrier, supra note 1, at 1024–36
(focusing on line extensions introduced before the expiration of contested patents but after
settlements of patent infringement litigation that stall generic entry on the original formulation);
Cheng, supra note 1, at 1497–515 (arguing that the antitrust concerns with product hopping have
merit in only limited circumstances).
3. See Shadowen et al., supra note 2, at 22–44 (offering a detailed empirical account of the
range and timing of drug product reformulations, which totaled 425 over the nearly 15 year study
period); Rebecca S. Yoshitani & Ellen S. Cooper, Pharmaceutical Reformulation: The Growth of
Life Cycle Management, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 379, 388–405 (2007) (discussing
reformulations of the molecular entity (by isolating metabolites, enantiomers, or polymorphs), new
dosage forms or routes of administration, and additional indications for use); Melody Petersen, New
Medicines Seldom Contain Anything New, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2002, at C1; Duff
Wilson, As Generics Near, Makers Tweak Erectile Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2011, at B1. Such
behavior occurs in other industries as well. See, e.g., Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco
Health Care Grp., 592 F.3d 991, 1000–02 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting antitrust claims against the
dominant supplier of pulse oximeters for introducing new devices when patents on older monitors
expired and it faced competition from suppliers of compatible sensors); Brianna M. Schonenberg,
Comment, Twenty Years in the Making: Transitioning Patented Seed Traits into the Generic Market,
97 MARQ. L. REV. 1039, 1057–60, 1070–71 (2014) (discussing efforts to switch farmers to
Monsanto’s second-generation Roundup Ready seeds).
4. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?,
8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 619–23 (2011); Amy Kapczynski et al., Polymorphs and
Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of “Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, 7
PLOS ONE e49470 (2012); Julie Appleby & Jayne O’Donnell, Consumers Pay as Drug Firms Fight
over Generics, USA TODAY, June 6, 2002, at 1A (“The average number of patents on a drug has
gone from two to 10 in the past two decades, according to the generic-drug industry.”); Melody
Petersen, Lilly Set Back in Patent Case over Prozac, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2000, at C1 (“Efforts to
extend the monopoly on a popular brand-name drug are common in the pharmaceutical industry. . . .
[O]ften companies file numerous patent applications on different aspects of the same drug—different
uses of the drug, for example, or slightly different formulations—to try to get even more years of
exclusive sales.”); see also Tahir Amin & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Secondary Patenting of Branded
Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of How Patents on Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended for Decades,
31 HEALTH AFF. 2286, 2291 (2012) (“The 108 patents we identified could extend the market
exclusivity of [Abbott’s] ritonavir and lopinavir/ritonavir to at least 2028—twelve years after the
expiration of the patents on their base compounds . . . .”).
5. See, e.g., Sun Pharm. Indus., Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 611 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
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Entirely apart from patents, however, market exclusivity periods granted
by licensing agencies such as the FDA represent important incentives for
innovative activity.6 New chemical entities generally receive a five-year
period of market exclusivity after securing agency approval for a new drug
application (NDA),7 which protects the brand-name manufacturer from
generic competition during that time even if it exceeds the remaining terms of
any patents.8 If the NDA sponsor has to undertake additional investigations in
order to secure supplemental approval for changes in a previously licensed
drug’s formulation or labeling, then it may receive three additional years of
protection but only with regard to the modified features of the drug product.9
Because the extra three years of market exclusivity for modifications in
the formulation or labeling of a brand-name drug would not prevent approval

(invalidating method-of-use patent for Gemzar® (gemcitabine) as a cancer treatment); id. at 1386
(“[O]bviousness-type double patenting encompasses any use for a compound that is disclosed in the
specification [as a utility] of an earlier patent claiming the compound and is later claimed as a
method of using that compound.”); Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1378–82
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming a decision that the compound claims in the patent for desloratadine
(Clarinex®), a metabolite formed upon ingestion of loratadine (Claritin®), were invalid because
inherently anticipated by prior art even though not disclosed in the earlier (and now expired)
compound patent for loratadine); see also Christine S. Paine, Comment, Brand-Name Drug
Manufacturers Risk Antitrust Violations by Slowing Generic Production Through Patent Layering,
33 SETON HALL L. REV. 479, 497–506 (2002) (reviewing earlier litigation).
6. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 347–48 (2007); id. at 359–61, 364–66 (calling market exclusivity
periods administered by the FDA “pseudo-patents”); id. at 387–88 (“Regulatory sources of
exclusivity have become more important as development times for new drugs have lengthened,
cutting further into product patent terms, and as industry ‘evergreening’ strategies to secure
additional follow-on patents have encountered obstacles in the courts.”); William E. Ridgway, Note,
Realizing Two-Tiered Innovation Policy Through Drug Regulation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1235–36
(2006) (explaining that this form of quasi-IP protection has become increasingly important).
7. See 21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2) (2014).
8. Conversely, if patents extend beyond this exclusivity period, then generic manufacturers
filing an application for abbreviated new drug approval (ANDA) must either delay launch until after
patent expiration or file a certification that the brand-name manufacturer’s listed patents are invalid
(or would not be infringed), which in turn entitles the patent holder to file an infringement action and
trigger an automatic 30-month stay on FDA approval of the ANDA (unless a court rules sooner). See
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). In effect, therefore, the manufacturer of a new chemical entity covered
by patent(s) later held to be invalid would not have to fear any generic competition for more than
seven years after securing agency approval. For further details about the operation of these and other
forms of FDA-mediated market exclusivity periods, see LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 1007–36 (3d ed. 2012).
9. See 21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii)-(iv); 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(5)(ii). In contrast, biological
products enjoy a twelve year exclusivity period, but FDA approval of a reformulated or relabeled
version does not entitle the sponsor to an extension unless the reformulation entailed a modification
to the structure of the product that results in a change to its safety, purity, or potency. See Biologics
Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148, Title VII(A), § 7002, 124 Stat.
804, 807–08 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(C)(ii) (2012)).
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of an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) referencing the original
product,10 sponsors may take additional steps to guard against the prospect
that generic competition will undercut their purportedly new and improved
products. For instance, after securing supplemental approval for a new use of
a previously licensed drug (with the new use protected by three years of
market exclusivity and possibly also a method patent), a brand-name
manufacturer might remove the originally approved indication(s) from the
drug’s labeling in an effort to prevent FDA approval of ANDAs for those
original use(s). In light of this opportunity for anticompetitive manipulation,
the agency explained that such a maneuver would prevent generic approval
only if the NDA sponsor removed the original use(s) for reasons of safety or
effectiveness.11
In the event of a reformulation, switching the original drug to over-thecounter (OTC) status may have a similar effect. The FDA may allow a brandname company to revise the labeling for an older formulation to permit its use
without the need for a prescription. AstraZeneca did this shortly after
introducing Nexium® (esomeprazole magnesium) for gastroesophageal reflux
disease just as its blockbuster drug Prilosec® (omeprazole) faced generic
competition.12 If switching the older drug brings with it three years of market
exclusivity, this would prevent generic competition on the now over-thecounter (OTC) product with its revised labeling.13 Even without any extended
exclusivity for the OTC version, generic competitors could only compete in
the nonprescription marketplace,14 thereby giving the reformulated

10. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493, 1496, 1499–500 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
see also Sigma-Tau Pharm., Inc. v. Schwetz, 288 F.3d 141, 145–48 (4th Cir. 2002) (same, in
connection with “orphan” drug exclusivity).
11. See Draft Guidance for Industry on Referencing Discontinued Labeling for Listed Drugs
in Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,225 (Oct. 26, 2000). For more on the nature
of agency guidance documents (especially those that it never finalizes), see Lars Noah, Governance
by the Backdoor: Administrative Law(lessness?) at the FDA, 93 NEB. L. REV. 89, 97–105 (2014).
12. See Daniel I. Gorlin, Staving off Death: A Case Study of the Pharmaceutical Industry’s
Strategies to Protect Blockbuster Franchises, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 823, 839–49 (2008). Persistent
shortages of OTC Prilosec led some observers to suspect that the manufacturer had done this
intentionally in order to increase the demand for Rx Nexium. See Alex Berenson, Where Has All the
Prilosec Gone?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at C1; Sarah Ellison & Jeanne Whalen, Prilosec Scarcity
Puts Spotlight on a P&G-AstraZeneca Pact, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2005, at B2.
13. See Lars Noah, Treat Yourself: Is Self-Medication the Prescription for What Ails
American Health Care?, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 359, 390 (2006) (“When sponsors file supplements
with supporting research in pursuit of an Rx-to-OTC switch, this right has additional value insofar as
it normally would prevent altogether the marketing of generic versions of the original prescription
product and entirely delay generic versions of the new OTC product for three years.”); Diedtra
Henderson, No-Competition Drugs Stir Controversy, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 13, 2006, at E1.
14. See Opportunity for Hearing on a Proposal to Withdraw Approval of Prescription
Polyethylene Glycol 3350 Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 73 Fed. Reg. 63,491, 63,491–92
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prescription product what amounts to an extended monopoly.
The actions of Abbott Laboratories with regard to TriCor® (fenofibrate)
have become something of a cause célèbre among antitrust commentators.15
Abbott had discontinued all sales of the original (capsule) formulation of this
drug for lowering cholesterol and trigylcerides in an effort to switch
prescribers to their newer (slightly lower dose tablet) formulation.16 In the
resulting antitrust litigation, the federal district court denied Abbott’s motion
to dismiss after making much of the fact that the company had gone to great
lengths to remove all traces of TriCor capsules from the marketplace as soon
as its tablet form became available.17 Two years later, in contrast, a different
district court dismissed antitrust claims filed against AstraZeneca,
emphasizing that the company had not entirely ceased marketing Prilosec

(Oct. 24, 2008); id. at 63,493 n.1 (explaining exceptions where a version of the original product
remained subject to prescription-only use); see also Noah, supra note 13, at 385 (“It might promote
clarity to understand such switches as a two-step process: the FDA revokes the NDA for the original
drug, which carried prescription labeling, but offers to issue a new (though financially less desirable)
license for an OTC version of the same drug as a substitute.”).
15. See Carrier, supra note 1, at 1019–20, 1029–30 n.149; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at
712–17; Silber & Kuritz, supra note 2, at 121–23; Cheng, supra note 1, at 1491–94, 1496–99, 1510–
12; see also Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 1, at 43 (calling this case “the poster child for the campaign
to condemn product hopping”); Shadowen et al., supra note 2, at 1 n.* (disclosing that all three of the
authors had worked on behalf of the plaintiffs in the TriCor litigation); id. at 62–65 (discussing the
case).
16. See Shirley S. Wang, TriCor Case May Illuminate Patent Limits, WALL ST. J., June 2,
2008, at B1 (reporting that the FTC was also investigating); see also Royall et al., supra note 1, at
74–75 (comparing antitrust claims filed by a generic competitor against Warner Chilcott after taking
similar steps with its acne drug Doryx®). Actavis recently announced plans to withdraw Namenda®
(memantine) almost one year before patent expiration so that existing patients would have to switch
to its newer extended-release version, which would make switching them back upon generic entry
more difficult. See Andrew Pollack, New York Files an Antitrust Suit Against the Maker of an
Alzheimer’s Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2014, at B3 (comparing the company’s tactics with the
TriCor case); see also Andrew Pollack, Judge Rules Drug Maker Can’t Shelve Old Pill, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2014, at B6 (reporting that a federal judge hearing an antitrust lawsuit filed by the state of
New York had issued a preliminary injunction against the company).
17. See Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 416–18 (D. Del. 2006)
(noting also a subsequent change in dosage and directions for use by dropping a need to take with
food, repurchases of previously distributed inventory in order to prevent continued dispensing of
refillable prescriptions, and a switch in the code for the older formulations in the privately managed
National Drug Data File to “obsolete”); id. at 421–24 (declining to dismiss antitrust claims because
the defendants had effectively prevented purchasers from selecting the older formulations and the
plaintiff might be able to prove that the anticompetitive effects of the reformulations outweighed
their benefits); see also Jonathan D. Rockoff, Abbott, Teva Reach a Deal to Delay a Generic TriCor,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2009, at B5 (“Abbott agreed to pay $184 million to settle litigation alleging that
the company modified TriCor to prevent pharmacists from automatically substituting generic
equivalents, a practice known as ‘product switching.’”); id. (reporting that “Abbott is trying to shift
TriCor users to a new, branded version called TriLipix that was approved late last year”).
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when it introduced Nexium.18
Unilateral withdrawal of an older brand-name product—coupled with its
removal from the FDA’s list known as the Orange Book—would complicate
but not prevent the approval of generic versions.19 This represents a subtle
but important point utterly lost on some commentators.20 To be sure, Abbott’s
promotional efforts would have shifted physician prescribing patterns in favor

18. See Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 148–49, 151–53
(D.D.C. 2008) (finding no plausible harm from the fact that the manufacturer had ceased adverting
its original prescription formulation and soon thereafter largely switched it OTC); id. at 152 (“The
fact that a new product siphoned off some of the sales from the old product and, in turn, depressed
sales of the generic substitutes for the old product, does not create an antitrust cause of action.”); see
also Shadowen, supra note 2, at 42 (“[O]ne court has suggested that the only product changes of
antitrust concern are those in which the manufacturer switched products and then also entirely
withdrew the original product from the market.”); cf. id. at 67–75, 78–79 (disagreeing with this view
as too restrictive).
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(I), (6) (2012) (barring approval of a pending ANDA—and
requiring withdrawal of a previously approved ANDA—if the reference listed drug (RLD) was
withdrawn for reasons of safety or effectiveness); Abbreviated New Drug Approval Regulations, 57
Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,990 (Apr. 28, 1992) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 314.122(a) (2014)) (“An
abbreviated new drug application that refers to . . . a listed drug that has been voluntarily withdrawn
from sale in the United States must be accompanied by a petition seeking a determination whether
the listed drug was withdrawn for safety or effectiveness reasons.”); see also Cumberland Pharm.
Inc. v. FDA, 981 F. Supp. 2d 38, 43–46, 48–53 (D.D.C. 2013) (affirming the agency’s conclusion
that the petitioner had not withdrawn its original formulation for safety reasons, which meant that the
FDA acted lawfully in approving a generic version of that product, even though the agency
previously had urged the petitioner to investigate the necessity of an inactive ingredient in the
original formulation because of its potential allergenicity, which prompted the company to introduce
a reformulated product that excluded this ingredient); ISTA Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 898 F. Supp. 2d
227, 232 (D.D.C. 2012) (calling objections to an ANDA referencing the original product after the
brand-name manufacturer had unilaterally withdrawn it in favor of a reformulated version “a poorlydisguised gambit to avoid competition, game the drug-approval system, and maintain a monopoly
over the bromfenac eyedrop market”); In re Reglan/Metoclopramide Litig., 74 A.3d 221, 223 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2013) (“[A]fter [ANDA approvals], the RLD holder discontinued marketing its drug, and
the FDA withdrew approval. Under applicable regulations, the FDA was empowered to fill the void
left by the withdrawn RLD by designating one of the generic manufacturers to serve as a
substitute.”), appeal denied, 99 A.3d 926 (Pa. 2014); Shadowen et al., supra note 2, at 70 (“[N]either
cannibalizing a product nor withdrawing it from the market prevents the FDA from approving the
generic of the original product or prevents doctors from writing prescriptions for it.”).
20. See Devlin, supra note 1, at 658 (“[I]f the [generic] company wants to market an identical
version of the [unilaterally withdrawn] drug for which it originally sought an ANDA, it will now
have to submit an NDA.”); Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 1, at 49 (same); Yoshitani & Cooper, supra
note 3, at 399–400 (explaining incorrectly that the reformulation of the contraceptive Ovcon 35® into
a chewable tablet coupled with the manufacturer’s removal of its NDA listing for the older tablet
(that could only be swallowed) from the Orange Book would bar generic entry on the latter dosage
form); Michelle L. Ethier, Note, Permissible Product Hopping: Why a Per Se Legal Rule Barring
Antitrust Liability Is Necessary to Protect Future Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 3
AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 323, 335 (2009) (repeating Mr. Devlin’s error); see also infra notes 53–54
and accompanying text (elaborating).
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of the new formulation,21 and this switch would have foreclosed the
possibility of generic substitution at the point of dispensing by pharmacists.
Physicians remained entirely free, however, to prescribe the original
formulation then available only from generic manufacturers,22 and perhaps
they would have done so because of restrictions in the formularies of their
patients’ drug benefit plans.23 As revealed in the next Part, Purdue managed
21. See Mark A. Hurwitz & Richard E. Caves, Persuasion or Information? Promotion and the
Shares of Brand Name and Generic Pharmaceuticals, 31 J.L. & ECON. 299, 302, 317–18 (1988);
Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the
Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 430–33 & n.257 (2002). Indeed, a manufacturer
could encourage such switching without altogether discontinuing its original version. See Andrew
Pollack, A Drug’s Second Act: Battling Jet Lag, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at B1 (discussing
Cephalon’s efforts to extend its Provigil® (modafinil) franchise by, prior to patent expiration, halting
all promotional efforts, substantially increasing its price and introducing the relatively less expensive
extended-release drug Nuvigil® (armodafinil) with additional indications); Jonathan D. Rockoff, How
a Drug Maker Tries to Outwit Generics, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2008, at Bl (“Some health-plan
managers say it will likely be too costly for them to keep patients on Provigil once Nuvigil is
introduced in 2009 because cheaper generic versions of Provigil will still be more than two years
off.”); cf. John Carreyrou, Inside Abbott’s Tactics to Protect AIDS Drug—Older Pill’s Price Hike
Helps Sales of Flagship; A Probe in Illinois, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2007, at Al (discussing a
manufacturer’s efforts to encourage use of its protease inhibitor combination Kaletra®
(lopinavir/ritonavir) by dramatically increasing the price of one of its components when sold
separately as Norvir® (and used in combination with other brand-name manufacturer’s drugs), adding
that this option seemed less likely to garner bad press than withdrawing Norvir from the market
altogether).
22. See Guy V. Amoresano, Branded Drug Reformulation: The Next Brand vs. Generic
Antitrust Battleground, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 249, 254–55 (2007); cf. Shadowen et al., supra note 2,
at 51–52 (dismissing this theoretical prospect as largely unrealistic). Although entitled to a different
form of intellectual property protection, which means that they face no real threat of generic
competition, and not subject to any form of regulatory licensing, textbooks offer a rough parallel:
producers respond to the growing supply of used copies by introducing new editions that may or may
not contain substantially new content (new editions of my casebook, cited in supra note 8, always
do); when instructors decide whether to adopt a new edition, they often do not care about the
differences in price (and, to the extent that they care more about having to revise their class notes,
instructors may be more willing to transition to barely improved new editions, while students might
find it inconvenient if not worse to purchase a used copy of the previous edition when enrolled in
such a course). In the end, however, instructors who do pay attention to the financial burden on their
students—perhaps because institutions may encourage them to do so when selecting textbooks—can
continue using older editions so long as adequate supplies of used copies remain available for their
students to purchase.
23. See Frank J. Ascione et al., Historical Overview of Generic Medication Policy, 41 J. AM.
PHARMACEUTICAL ASS’N 567, 573–74 (2001); Daniel A. Crane, Provigil: A Commentary, 3
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 453, 454–55 (2011); Milt Freudenheim, Not Quite What Doctor
Ordered: Drug Substitutions Add to Discord over Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1996, at D1.
But cf. Shadowen et al., supra note 2, at 19 (“Despite [managed care organizations’] theoretical
ability to use disadvantaged formulary placement and other tactics to defeat anticompetitive product
reformulations, they have not done so.”). Thus, when generic versions of one drug in a therapeutic
class become available, other similar drugs may lose significant market share even though still patent
protected. See Scott Hensley, Side Effects: As Generics Pummel Its Drugs, Pfizer Faces Uncertain
Future, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2006, at A1.
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to eliminate even that last avenue of potential competition when it
reformulated OxyContin, and the company managed to do so in a way that
would largely escape antitrust scrutiny.24
II. NEW & IMPROVED PRODUCT HOPPING: THE OXYCONTIN MANEUVER
Over the last two decades, the opioid analgesic OxyContin has followed a
decidedly convoluted path, hardly typical of other blockbuster drugs. The
latest interesting twist in this still unfolding story happened in 2013 when the
FDA decided that generic competitors could not yet enter the marketplace.
The particulars may interest only those steeped in this somewhat arcane
regulatory field, but this case study touches on important broader themes
related to public health and patient welfare.25 It also illustrates a novel twist
on the product hopping phenomenon in the pharmaceutical industry.
Approved by the FDA in 1995, OxyContin quickly (and somewhat
unexpectedly) became the most widely prescribed narcotic painkiller in the
United States; by its fifth anniversary on the market, the drug generated more
than $1 billion annually for its manufacturer Purdue Pharma.26 Although
regulated by the FDA as a “new drug” (and by the Drug Enforcement
Administration as a Schedule II controlled substance), it represented little
more than a new formulation of long-used (and abused) oxycodone
hydrochloride, a synthetic form of morphine effective in relieving severe or
chronic pain such as that experienced by cancer patients. Older painkillers
such as Percocet® and Percodan® also contain oxycodone, but OxyContin
used a slow-release mechanism designed to offer sustained relief over a
twelve-hour period to patients with chronic moderate to severe pain. In
contrast, the older drug products in this class (including the related
hydrocodone drugs such as Vicodin® and Lortab®) may offer uneven relief
over just a four-hour period.27
The extended-release formulation also seemed to make OxyContin less
prone to abuse because it would not provide a quick euphoric effect upon
24. Generally, when a private party successfully petitions the government to render a decision
that has the effect of restraining competition, antitrust laws have no application. See City of
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379–82 (1991); Dogan & Lemley, supra note
1, at 706–07 & n.91.
25. See Lars Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management Technologies,
31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 55, 63–64 (2003).
26. See Chris Adams, Painkiller’s Sales Far Exceeded Maker’s Plans—Purdue Pharma
Scrambled to Expand Its Production of OxyContin Medication, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2002, at D2.
In contrast, Purdue’s newer extended-release hydromorphone product (Palladone®) spent less than a
year on the market before its withdrawal because of serious risks that it posed to patients. See Marc
Kaufman, Painkiller Palladone Pulled over Alcohol Risk, WASH. POST, July 14, 2005, at A14.
27. See Paul Tough, The Alchemy of OxyContin, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 29, 2001, at 32.
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initial ingestion. As a result, Purdue widely promoted its drug as presenting a
lower risk of addiction and diversion.28 The company apparently failed,
however, to anticipate the creativity of drug abusers. To defeat the slowrelease feature, these individuals chewed, crushed, dissolved, or scraped the
coating off of the tablets, leaving stronger dosages of oxycodone than found
in individual Percocet or Percodan tablets.29 They then ingested, snorted, or
injected the substance. Reports suggest that thousands of people have died
after overdosing in this fashion,30 and data from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) indicate that most of the deaths and other
injuries linked to this and similar drugs have occurred in persons other than
legitimate patients.31
Some critics alleged that Purdue had over-promoted OxyContin for the
treatment of temporary or less serious pain,32 arguing that this led to
overprescribing, thereby creating a larger supply for potential diversion.33
The company also evidently underplayed the hazards faced by patients who
used the drug as intended.34 In 2001, responding to patterns of irresponsible
prescribing, the FDA demanded that OxyContin’s package insert add a blackbox warning.35 This represented part of a risk-management plan that also
included a mechanism for tracking suspected sources of diversion, educating
28. See Barry Meier & Eric Lipton, Under Attack, Drug Maker Turned to Giuliani for Help,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2007, at A1.
29. See generally BARRY MEIER, PAIN KILLER: A “WONDER” DRUG’S TRAIL OF ADDICTION
AND DEATH (2003).
30. See Lisa Girion et al., Drugs Now Deadlier Than Autos; Fueled by Highly Addictive
Prescription Pain Medications, Fatal Overdoses Have Surpassed Traffic Deaths Nationwide, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2011, at A1; see also Leonard Paulozzi et al., CDC Grand Rounds: Prescription
Drug Overdoses—A U.S. Epidemic, 61 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 10, 10 (2012)
(“Since 2003, more overdose deaths have involved opioid analgesics than heroin and cocaine
combined . . . .”).
31. See Charles Ornstein & Tracy Weber, Ties Between Drugmakers, Advocacy Groups
Probed, WASH. POST, May 9, 2012, at A2; see also Aron J. Hall et al., Patterns of Abuse Among
Unintentional Pharmaceutical Overdose Fatalities, 300 JAMA 2613, 2616–17 (2008) (finding, in a
study of overdose deaths in West Virginia over a five-year period, that 93% involved opioid
analgesics and that the majority of victims had not secured these with a valid prescription).
32. See Mark A. Ford, Note, Another Use of OxyContin: The Case for Enhancing Liability for
Off-Label Drug Marketing, 83 B.U. L. REV. 429 (2003); Phillip J. Wininger, Note, Pharmaceutical
Overpromotion Liability: The Legal Battle over Rural Prescription Drug Abuse, 93 KY. L.J. 269
(2004-2005). Courts generally have, however, rejected negligent marketing claims involving
OxyContin. See, e.g., Labzda v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
33. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-110, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: OXYCONTIN
ABUSE AND DIVERSION AND EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM (2003).
34. See Carrie Johnson, OxyContin Makers Admit Deception: Addiction Danger from
Painkiller Was Understated, WASH. POST, May 11, 2007, at A1.
35. See Josh White, More Warnings About OxyContin; FDA, Drugmaker Advise Caution in
Prescribing Addictive Painkiller, WASH. POST, July 26, 2001, at B2.
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physicians, and supplying special prescription pads.36 By 2008, the FDA
directed Purdue to cease claiming that there was only a small risk of addiction
in patients.37 Meanwhile, the Justice Department brought misbranding
prosecutions, and Purdue paid $600 million to settle claims asserted by
numerous parties after pleading guilty to felony charges for fraudulently
claiming that OxyContin was less prone to abuse.38
As Purdue’s regulatory market exclusivity period wound down, a pair of
other companies filed applications with the FDA seeking approval of generic
versions of OxyContin. Because it had secured patents that ran until roughly
2013 (extending well beyond its market exclusivity period),39 Purdue initiated
infringement litigation to prevent premature FDA approval of these copycats.
Then, in 2004, after one of its patent lawsuits initially failed,40 Purdue filed a
petition with the FDA asking that the agency not approve generic versions
until those potential competitors had established abuse-management programs
comparable to its own.41 A few months later, the FDA approved a pair of
36. See Anna Wilde Mathews & Gary Fields, Federal Agencies Seek to Curb Abuse of Potent
Painkillers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2003, at B1.
37. See Peter Whoriskey, The Prescription Painkiller Binge, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2012, at
A1.
38. See United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572–73, 576 (W.D. Va.
2007) (accepting plea agreements by the company as well as three high-ranking corporate officers
each of whom received sentences of three years of probation and together paid $34.5 million in
fines); Barry Meier, 3 Officials Are Sentenced in Case Involving OxyContin, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
2007, at C4; see also Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813, 828 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (reversing and
remanding orders excluding these officers from participating in federal health care programs for 12
years).
39. See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH, 98 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367–70,
400 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (summarizing the patents, and granting a preliminary injunction on patent
infringement claims after a competitor received FDA approval of a full NDA for a controlled-release
oxycodone product), aff’d, 237 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001). One decade later, with less than a
year of patent protection remaining, Purdue belatedly initiated a pediatric study in the hopes of
receiving six months of extra market exclusivity. See Barry Meier, After Delay, OxyContin’s Use in
Young Under Study, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2012, at B1.
40. See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Inc., No. 00–CV–8029, 2004 WL 26523, at *27
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2004) (declining to enforce Purdue’s patents due to inequitable conduct during
their prosecution before the PTO).
41. See Gardiner Harris, OxyContin Manufacturer Seeks Delay of Rival Drugs, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2004, at C2; see also Michael A. Carrier & Daryl Wander, Citizen Petitions: An Empirical
Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 249, 287–88 (2012) (discussing Purdue’s request as an illustration of a
pattern of behavior increasingly engaged in by brand-name drug manufacturers); Marc Kaufman,
Petitions to FDA Sometimes Delay Generic Drugs: Critics Say Companies Misusing Process, WASH.
POST, July 3, 2006, at A1 (elaborating on this tactic); cf. Alicia Mundy, Senate Panel Hits Sanofi
Payments, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2011, at B3 (reporting that the manufacturer of Lovenox®
(enoxaparin sodium) had contributed more than $5 million to medical groups who then agreed to file
a purportedly independent citizen petition with the FDA questioning (though unsuccessfully) the
bioequivalence of a proposed generic version of this blockbuster anticoagulant). See generally
Matthew Avery et al., The Antitrust Implications of Filing “Sham” Citizen Petitions with the FDA,
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ANDAs subject to that condition, though the pending appeal of the patent
litigation made launching the generic products a risky proposition at that
time.42 Ultimately, the appellate court largely sided with Purdue,43 which
meant a further delay for these competitors.
After the filing of several tort lawsuits,44 and under pressure from federal
and state government officials,45 Purdue began to work on an abuse-resistant
formulation of its flagship product. Originally, it considered adding a
sequestered opioid antagonist (such as naltrexone) that could counteract the
oxycodone when crushed.46 Ultimately, Purdue decided to harden the tablets
by infusing them with a polymer (polyethylene oxide); even if still crushed,
the powdery interior would become jelly-like when added to water. In 2010,
more than two years after submitting an application for this reformulation to
the FDA, Purdue received approval for OxyContin OP®.47
As a line extension that required additional studies, OxyContin OP
received three years of market exclusivity,48 though patents covering this
reformulation extended much longer—until 2025.49 Even if a court ultimately
found the patents for OxyContin OP invalid, the mere fact that the
65 HASTINGS L.J. 113, 124–26, 132–40 (2013); Lars Noah, Sham Petitioning as a Threat to the
Integrity of the Regulatory Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1995).
42. See Anna Wilde Mathews & Leila Abboud, FDA Approves Generic OxyContin, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 24, 2004, at A3. Nonetheless, generic versions did compete against the brand-name
product for a few years. See Drew Buono, New Delivery Systems Advance Pain Management
Medications, DRUG STORE NEWS, Apr. 21, 2008, at 32, available at 2008 WLNR 25523741.
43. See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1135–37 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
44. See Joseph B. Prater, Comment, West Virginia’s Painful Settlement: How the OxyContin
Phenomenon and Unconventional Theories of Tort Liability May Make Pharmaceutical Companies
Liable for Black Markets, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1409, 1418 (2006) (“By late 2003, OxyContin was the
source of nearly 300 state and federal lawsuits against Purdue . . . .”). For a comprehensive recent
review of the various lawsuits related to OxyContin, see Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Litigation
in the Fight Against Prescription Drug Abuse, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1117 (2014).
45. See Barry Meier, U.S. Asks Painkiller Maker to Help Curb Wide Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May
1, 2001, at A16; see also Ausness, supra note 44, at 1146–57 (discussing civil and criminal claims
against Purdue brought by state and federal officials); id. at 1163–65 (concluding that this public
litigation has had a somewhat greater impact than private lawsuits).
46. See Barry Meier, Maker Chose Not to Use a Drug Abuse Safeguard, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
13, 2001, at A11. Along similar lines, some had suggested including a chemical irritant such as
capsaicin. See Sandra Blakeslee, Drug Makers Hope to Kill the Kick in Pain Relief, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 2004, at F1.
47. See Abby Goodnough & Katie Zezima, Drug Is Harder to Abuse, but Users Persevere,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at A21; see also Lisa Girion, FDA Approves Recast Painkiller; Experts
Are Wary of a Drug Called a Less-Addictive Form of OxyContin, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2014, at AA1
(“Purdue Pharma’s Targiniq ER combines a long-acting form of the opioid analgesic oxycodone with
the medication naloxone, which is commonly used to reverse the effects of an opioid overdose.”).
48. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
49. See Timothy W. Martin, Generic OxyContin Pains the FDA—Patent Expiration Brings
Debate over Abuse Deterrents, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2013, at B1.
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manufacturer had listed them would forestall FDA approval of any generics
for a few more years past the end of the new exclusivity period.50 Normally,
however, the agency would allow generic versions of the older formulation on
the market,51 but in this case that did not happen; on the very day that
Purdue’s initial patents expired and the previously approved generics would
have launched, the agency withdrew its approval for original OxyContin on
safety grounds.52
Only once before has the FDA granted a request from a brand-name
company simply to revoke the license for an older version of a drug,53 which
effectively pulls the rug out from under potential generic competitors. In
2003, the agency withdrew Tegison® (etretinate), four years after its sponsor
had begun marketing a safer version.54 If Purdue’s recent similar experience
50. See supra note 8.
51. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
52. See Barry Meier, F.D.A. Bars Generic OxyContin, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2013, at B1. In
contrast, just one month later, the FDA rejected a similar request from Endo Pharmaceuticals after
that company introduced a reformulated version of its extended-release oxymorphone product
(Opana ER®) because the agency found the new drug no better at deterring abuse. See Timothy W.
Martin, FDA Says Pain Pill Still Easy to Abuse, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2013, at B4; Katie Thomas,
F.D.A. Rejects Request to Keep Generic Rivals of Painkiller off the Market, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
2013, at B3.
53. Cf. Shadowen et al., supra note 2, at 43 tbl.7 (identifying three instances of a brand-name
manufacturer withdrawing an original formulation near generic entry—TriCor, Versed, Zithromax—
even though none of these involved FDA withdrawal of the license); id. at 57–58 (offering Hytrin as
a fourth such example though not included in their survey because its reformulation from tablet to
capsule occurred before 1995). An OTC switch amounts to a partial license withdrawal, see supra
note 14, but Purdue obviously could not have done that with OxyContin. The FDA may, of course,
remove brand-name prescription drugs (and with it the possibility of generic competition on those
drugs) once serious safety questions arise or safer substitutes from other manufacturers become
available. See, e.g., Removal of Nomifensine Maleate from List of Approved Drug Products, 51 Fed.
Reg. 21,981, 21,982 (June 17, 1986) (“As a consequence of the removal [of the antidepressant
Merital for reasons of safety], ANDA’s will not be accepted for the drug.”); Denise Grady, Doctors
Call for Caution on Two More Diabetes Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2000, at A10 (Rezulin®);
Gardiner Harris, Studies Lead to Withdrawal of Drug for Bowel Ailment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2007,
at A12 (Zelnorm®); Findings, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2007, at A8 (reporting that the FDA requested
the withdrawal of the Parkinson’s disease drug pergolide, a dopamine agonist, because it had been
associated with heart valve damage since 2002 and “[t]here are other drugs in the same class that can
be substituted”).
54. See Lars Noah, Too High a Price for Some Drugs?: The FDA Burdens Reproductive
Choice, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 231, 238 (2007); cf. Bruce Ingersoll, FDA Proposes to Force Seldane
Off the Market, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1997, at B1 (reporting that the agency initiated a proposal—
over the manufacturer’s objections—to withdraw Seldane® (terfenadine), less than two weeks after
authorizing generic entry, because six months earlier it had approved a reformulated and safer
version sold as Allegra® (fexofenadine) by the same manufacturer). Interestingly, the previously
mentioned survey that had treated discontinued marketing as instances of “withdrawal” (and found
three such cases during the period studied) had failed to include Tegison in this category, see
Shadowen et al., supra note 2, at 43 tbl.7, even though the authors separately had discussed this
reformulation as an instance of metabolite switching, see id. at 25 n.74.
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indicates that the FDA has become more willing to entertain such withdrawal
petitions,55 it offers a potentially enticing new opportunity for anticompetitive
behavior. Then again, in light of the growing tendency of courts to impose
liability on manufacturers of brand-name drugs for injuries caused by their
generic rivals,56 innovator companies may have an obligation to prevent any
further sales of now obsolete drugs after introducing a genuinely new and
improved reformulation.57
The FDA has no power to demand that Purdue license its patents on the
reformulated drug to others. On the contrary, the company has jealously
guarded its franchise, initiating numerous lawsuits to prevent the use of its
new abuse-resistant formulation by generic competitors.58 The problem
differs from another type of intellectual property question that has arisen in
this setting—where generic sellers must closely track the labeling for a brandname drug, courts have rejected copyright infringement claims brought by the
latter.59 Similarly, when the Celgene Corporation created its complex risk
management program for Thalomid® (thalidomide) to guard against the risk
of birth defects, it secured patents on it—and, when the four manufacturers of
isotretinoin (Roche’s Accutane®) had to create a similar program, they
managed to purchase licenses from Celgene.60 Of course, because Celgene
did not compete in the acne drug marketplace, it had no reason to resist these
licensing agreements.61
55. See David Sell, Endo Pharmaceuticals Fails in Maneuver to Have Own Drug Called
Unsafe, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 21, 2012, at A27.
56. See, e.g., Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, No. 1101397, 2014 WL 4055813 (Ala. Aug. 15, 2014);
Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 309–18 (Ct. App. 2008).
57. See Lars Noah, Adding Insult to Injury: Paying for Harms Caused by a Competitor’s
Copycat Product, 45 TORT TRIAL & INSUR. PRAC. L.J. 673, 680 (2010); cf. Linda A. Johnson, Wyeth
Sues FDA to Block Generic Rival of Antibiotic Zosyn, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 24, 2009, at 10
(summarizing objections to the agency’s approval of a generic version of an older formulation that
the brand-name manufacturer had discontinued four years earlier after it added a pair of ingredients
to guard against the possibility of a dangerous chemical reaction).
58. See Timothy W. Martin, OxyContin Maker Guards Exclusivity, WALL ST. J., June 28,
2012, at A1.
59. See SmithKline Beecham v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 211 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2000).
60. See Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REV.
839, 888 (2009).
61. In contrast, Celgene has faced criticism for refusing to supply samples of Thalomid and
Revlimid, which also faces stringent distribution restrictions to guard against birth defects, to generic
manufacturers that need them in order to engage in bioequivalence testing necessary for seeking
FDA approval. See Dina ElBoghdady, Generic-Drug Makers’ Complaints Prompt Inquiries, WASH.
POST, May 23, 2012, at A15; Katie Thomas, Game Plan Against Generics, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,
2013, at B1; cf. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(8) (2012) (“No holder of an approved covered application shall
use any element to assure safe use required by the Secretary under this subsection to block or delay
approval of an . . . abbreviated new drug application.”); Shashank Upadhye & Braden Lang, The
FDA and Patent, Antitrust, and Property Takings Laws: Strange Bedfellows Useful to Unblock
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Even if Congress gave the FDA some power to facilitate generic
competition in such circumstances, the agency would have had no real
incentive to do so insofar as price reductions for opioid analgesics might
further expand the black market.62 In contrast, after a company launched a
new drug for preterm labor at what struck many as an exorbitant price, FDA
officials threatened to undercut the brand-name manufacturer’s exclusivity
rights by either allowing premature generic competition or tolerating
pharmacy compounding,63 and a federal court declined to entertain a
challenge to the agency’s announcement.64 In the case of slow-release
oxycodone, the FDA seems untroubled by the fact that it has deferred the
prospect of generic competition for as much as a dozen more years, and
Purdue need not fear any antitrust litigation by virtue of the agency’s
decision.65
For legitimate patients, OxyContin OP represents no improvement over
the original formula. On the contrary, the FDA’s decision to withdraw the
license for OxyContin contemporaneously with approval of the reformulated
version ensures that, for at least another decade, patients will have to pay
extra for features that they neither want nor need. Indeed, if agency licensing
of other off-patent opioid analgesics that include abuse-resistant features will
come with similar withdrawals of previously approved versions, then it gives
brand-name companies an incentive to develop such products and charge
legitimate patients a premium.66
Although it seems entirely sensible to remove more easily abused and far
cheaper generics, we should not lose sight of the barely visible trade-off that

Access to Blocked Drugs, 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 84, 95–100 (2014) (discussing the limited
apparent force of this provision).
62. See Devlin Barrett et al., U.S. on Alert for Canadian Drugs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2012, at
A2.
63. See Rob Stein, Price Tag Soars on Preterm Birth Drug, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2011, at
A1.
64. See K-V Pharm. Co. v. FDA, 889 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2012).
65. See supra note 24. Of course, the FDA’s withdrawal decision provides powerful
endorsement of the sponsor’s claim that a reformulated product represents a genuine improvement
over the older drug. Conversely, a decision by the FDA to reject such a request (or perhaps a failure
by a sponsor to even make one) may indicate that a reformulation represents a trivial advance done
primarily to fend off generic competition. In short, the availability of this regulatory maneuver could
help courts undertake the rule-of-reason analysis when drug reformulations trigger antitrust claims.
66. See Timothy W. Martin & Jonathan D. Rockoff, Race Accelerates for Safer Painkiller,
WALL ST. J., May 6, 2013, at B1; see also Lisa Girion, Powerful Painkiller Approved, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 2014, at A8 (reporting that the FDA approved Purdue’s abuse-resistant extended-release
hydrocodone drug (Hysingla ER®), and noting speculation that this might persuade the agency to
withdraw its controversial recent approval of the lower-dose pure hydrocodone drug Zohydro® that
lacks such safeguards).
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the FDA has made in this case.67 “Law-enforcement officials have long been
concerned about the potential for a bigger, cheaper, less well-controlled
supply once versions of OxyContin are marketed by multiple companies,”
but, when the FDA tentatively approved generic versions of OxyContin a
decade ago, it reportedly “didn’t believe that the availability of generic
versions would increase demand for the drug . . . [while it] may cut the cost
for legitimate patients.”68 Of course, an abuse-resistant option did not exist at
the time, but the agency’s recent change of heart apparently elevates public
health and law enforcement needs over the interests of patients for whom cost
may pose a genuine barrier to access.
CONCLUSION
Purdue’s successful maneuver may well inspire manufacturers of other
drugs to seek FDA withdrawal of their licenses for older versions in order to
block approval of generic copies of the original, which otherwise would have
threatened to undercut sales of newly approved formulations. If antitrust
objections lodged against less complete efforts at product hopping have merit,
then the license withdrawal strategy surely magnifies concerns about
illegitimate monopolization. Then again, to the extent that the license holder
successfully persuades the FDA that its line extension offers genuine
improvements that render the original formulation obsolete, antitrust laws
would have no application. The agency must, therefore, carefully guard
against the possibility of anticompetitive manipulation of this process.

67. See Timothy W. Martin, FDA Blocks Generic Versions of OxyContin, WALL ST. J., Apr.
17, 2013, at B3; cf. David M. Kent et al., New and Dis-improved: On the Evaluation and Use of Less
Effective, Less Expensive Medical Interventions, 24 MED. DECISION MAKING 281, 282 (2004)
(“Although lower quality, lower cost products are ubiquitous in most consumer markets, barriers
remain for . . . cost-saving medical technologies.”).
68. Mathews & Abboud, supra note 42, at A3.

